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Introduction 
Homo economicus and/or homo psychologicus: Full knowledge to maximise utility and/or no big deal 
and plenty to occupy the mind? 
One motivation for the growing interest in context dependent process rules in choice analysis is a view, 
well articulated by a growing number of economists since the classic contributions of Herbert Simon 
(1957) and Harvey Lieberman (1976), which questions the very rigid or oversimplification view of the 
theory of microeconomics centred on ‘economic man’. It promotes the view that while some real 
problems do lend themselves admirably to the type of analysis that can be conducted on the basis of 
existing micro-theory, producing useful results, there are a great many other problems where current 
economic theory is either not very useful or the ‘essential points are actually obscured or masked by the 
conventional mode of thought’ (Leibenstein page 8). Leibenstein suggests that there is a wide range of 
problems for which a broader based theory (in terms of behavioural assumptions) is called for as a basis 
of analysis and diagnosis. He further comments on the standard economic model as being “… only 
concerned with logic, not with realism, and hence need not worry about the artificial nature of such a 
world (page 5).”  
The simplification is often the result of a desire to be able to satisfy very strong axiomatic conditions 
that have elegant mathematical properties but which typically deviate from reality and relevance in 
consumer choice and decision making. Leibenstein characterises the conventional economic approach 
by the phrase ‘complete constraint concerned “calculation” in the pursuit of precise objectives’ (page 
72). He promotes the idea of replacing the idea, in the traditional economic approach, that decision 
techniques or procedures (what we now refer to as process heuristics) which involve no choice 
whatsoever (i.e., they are the underlying processing mechanism), do indeed have choice merit and are 
related to rationality in what he describes as calculatedness. This draws on inspiration from Herbert 
Simon (fn. page 73) who distinguished between rationality as viewed by cognitive psychology and the 
views of economics. Under cognitive psychology, rationality applies to a process of partial calculation 
and choice under which the complete consequences of different options are not given at the outset. 
The concept of constraint concern is a vector of traits along a continuum interpreted as reflecting 
degrees of rationality, and includes realism of context assessment, non-reflexibility of assessments (i.e., 
cool and calm compared to knee jerk responses), and learning from experience. Situation assessment 
realism is of particular importance to research on process heuristics that are context dependent, which 
Leibenstein comments on as (page 82) ‘… individuals in a decision situation usually have to assess the 
nature of the situation and the nature of the alternatives. At one extreme we can try to make as realistic 
as assessment as possible; at the other we can base our assessments entirely on wishful thinking’.  
Leibenstein (page 8) discusses the interpretation of utility and suggests that although one can interpret 
utility in such a way that all behaviour is subsumed under some version of utility maximisation, this 
would ‘rob the concepts of utility and maximisation of real meaning’. ‘If we are presumed to do 
something which has some degree of specificity, then there must be something else for which it can be 
said we are not filling the criteria of the first type of action. That is, the idea of utility maximisation 
must contain the possibility of choice under which utility is not maximised’. This aligns with the 
position of many economists and cognitive psychologists that ‘…it was desirable to loosen the 
psychological assumptions behind normal economic behaviour in such a way so that rationality did not 
necessarily imply maximising utility, as that concept is normally used.’ Although utility maximisation 
is consistent with rational behaviour, it is not a necessary ingredient of it. A good example is random 
regret minimisation. More generally, the message here is that ‘…as a basis for individual behavior, 
variations in the psychological assumptions which are presumed to be the determination of behavior’ 
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should be permissible and supported. Among the insufficiently considered aspects of micro-theory is 
the analysis of effort (page 7).  
 
This aligns with Leibenstein’s promotion of the theory of selective rationality, suggesting that there is 
an important sense in which non-maximising behaviour is not at all irrational. Rationality has 
components. Individuals are willing to forgo some of the advantages of ‘extreme rationality’ or some 
components of rationality because of the costs of the decision process, and they may be willing to bear 
the pressure costs of behaviour under less than full rationality. This aligns well with the idea that 
individuals use various context-linked rules (or heuristics) to process situations in arriving at a choice, 
and hence a preference revelation.  Leibenstein goes on to talk about habit (in some sense linked to 
repeat effort). Economic theory usually does not distinguish explicitly between one-time only situations 
or a variety of contexts whose appearance over time is in a clear-cut pattern. If contexts are periodic 
(like the regular commute trip), individuals may work out a simplified decision procedure in which they 
find it convenient to repeat their behaviour pattern time after time. Individuals in situations where 
contexts are repeated are likely to have present position preference which is a mode of behaviour called 
‘ratchet rationality’ (Leibenstien page 88). This is where the status quo or referenced experience makes 
good sense as a habitual reference point (as well as Value Learning) which they prefer not to leave 
unless the potential gain of moving out of the groove or the potential loss of not moving (as reflected 
in RAM) are beyond some threshold values. Clearly there is also the matter in part on whether or not 
an individual has a strong preference for novelty (variety seeking). All of this discussion aligns with an 
interest in process heuristics as behavioural mechanisms used by an individual to assist or simplify the 
assessment of contexts (essentially a preference accommodation process) leading to a choice outcome. 
 
In summary, maximising behaviour implies that individuals will use their capabilities or capacities to 
the greatest degree possible in order to obtain, from the context, the largest economic gain. However, 
under a number of psychological postulates, so clearly set out by Leinbenstein amongst others, most 
individuals (perhaps all) do not behave in this manner. This is described as constraint concern and is 
reflected in the various ways we would want to explore the context in which individuals bring to bear 
one or more rules to assist them in choice making. While these rules become complex analytical 
functions, they are no more than behaviourally simplifying rules made by individuals to help in 
processing information and making decisions. This is the sentiment of our note. This means some degree 
of violation (on non-compliance) with the very strict assumptions of the economic man model, but this 
is the trade-off which Leibenstein promotes as value adding and necessary. 
 
Kenneth Train in his 2003 book on ‘Discrete choice Modelling and Simulation’ says “Discrete choice 
models are usually derived under an assumption of utility-maximizing behavior by the decision maker. 
Thurstone (1927) originally developed the concepts in terms of psychological stimuli, leading to a 
binary probit model of whether respondents can differentiate the level of stimulus. Marschak (1960) 
interpreted the stimuli as utility and provided a derivation from utility maximization. Following 
Marschak, models that can be derived in this way are called random utility models (RUMs). It is 
important to note, however, that models derived from utility maximization can also be used to represent 
decision making that does not entail utility maximization. The derivation assures that the model is 
consistent with utility maximization; it does not preclude the model from being consistent with other 
forms of behavior. The models can also be seen as simply describing the relation of explanatory 
variables to the outcome of a choice, without reference to exactly how the choice is made.” This aligns 
well with the position promoted by Leibensten in paragraph four above. 
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Appendix: A note on Welfare Measures  
 
Although the focus of this note is not on welfare implications, which was the initial motivation for 
writing this short paper when questions of context dependency were raised with the author in a recent 
paper, and a reason why it might be problematic in focussing on willingness to pay (WTP) estimates 
under non-linear context dependent choice models with embedded process heuristics, it might be useful 
to provide a short  summary of the key challenges facing context dependent choice models in 
establishing WTP estimates compliant with standard economic theory.  
 
In general, marginal valuations (i.e., WTP) rely upon the concept of indifference, and welfare 
measurements (i.e., consumer surplus) rely upon the concept of integrability. In turn, these two concepts 
are underpinned by two constructs - namely utility and demand and the mapping between them (Batley 
and Ibanez 2013a,b). These two conditions are synonymous with the conventional economic 
framework. Against this background, if a researcher specifies a model which - on the face of it - departs 
from utility maximisation (or random utility maximisation (RUM), if in a probabilistic context), then 
there are (at least) two scenarios which could arise: 
 
a) The model is reconcilable with utility maximisation (e.g., as would apply to elimination by aspects 
(EBA) and the inclusion of risk attitude and perceptual conditioning, for example), and this form can 
be defensibly used to generate indifference and integrability. 
b) The model is not reconcilable with RUM (e.g., as would apply to relative advantage model (RAM), 
for example), and this form cannot be defensibly used to generate indifference and integrability. 
 
Violations of the Batley and Ibanez (2013a) assumptions may arise quicker than one may expect. If 
such violations occur, the labelling of U as an indirect utility function, is incorrect as the connection 
with a rational consumer maximising his or her direct utility subject to a budget constraint no longer 
holds. This poses choice modellers with a trade-off between behavioural relevance and the possibility 
of conducting meaningful welfare analysis. Behavioural relevance allows researchers to exploit the 
wide range of econometrically possible formulations of the ‘indirect utility function’, i.e., the regression 
equation deﬁning the attractiveness of a speciﬁc alternative. In the context of discrete choice models, 
where demand is restricted to unity (i.e., no induced demand and pure substitution), non-linear income 
effects are not consistent with economic theory. Any additional income must be spent on the numeraire 
good which by deﬁnition has to be path independent, i.e., not subject to an income effect. In many 
applications it is relatively safe to assume that there is no income effect, and only substitution effects, 
which is reasonable in most urban mode choice applications. Hence the usefulness of b) is in explaining 
and predicting behaviour1.   
 
Although we understand the conditions that need to be satisfied to be able to use WTP estimates in the 
traditional cost-benefit framework, we can draw on the important contribution of ‘McConnell (1995, 
pages 264-5) who states that ‘One ought to be able to compute intuitively appealing measures of 
consumer surplus well-being that do not depend on the primitive utility function. If there is a change in 
behavior, there is also a welfare change.” There is huge value in investigating this possibility and the 
trade-offs that have to be made under context dependent process heuristics such as value learning (VL) 
and RAM. We offer some commentary below on the issues that need specific consideration. If the 
analyst focusses on behavioural responses (such as the elasticity output), they do not have to be 
                                                          
1 On a more pragmatic note, there could be a middle ground where predictions from a non-RUM were combined 
with marginal valuations from a RUM to generate measures of expected consumer surplus. We thank Richard 
Batley for this observation. 
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concerned about the economic welfare interpretation, making their model still useful in prediction (in 
contrast to economic evaluation via CBA). 
 
In an important paper, Dekker and Chorus (2018) promote an approach to be able to obtain consumer 
surplus for choices and WTP estimates for attributes of alternatives under process heuristics that do not 
satisfy indifference and integrability. It is in line with the position taken by McConnell (1995, pages 
264-5) cited above.  Dekker and Chorus add that ‘… if one is willing to accept that a model is a viable 
representation of (potentially irrational) choice behaviour, this opens a door towards meaningful welfare 
analysis, albeit … in a limited number of cases.’ Furthermore, by treating the choice probabilities ‘as if 
they were’ probabilistic demand functions, Dekker and Chorus are able to develop a monetary analogue 
to the traditional Marshallian consumer surplus, drawing on ideas from McConnell. Although such an 
approximation is inherently imperfect, as Dekker and Chorus state, it reﬂects the price paid for adopting 
a behavioural economics approach, which is the emphasis of a growing number of papers where process 
heuristics such as VL and RAM are inherently behavioural phenomenon that do not strictly, in all cases, 
align with the conventional economic framework. 
 
Dekker and Chorus (2018) measure (changes in) consumer surplus by studying (changes in) observed 
behaviour, i.e., the choice probability, in response to price (changes). They interpret the choice 
probability as a well-behaved approximation of the probabilistic demand curve, and accordingly 
measure the consumer surplus as the area under this demand curve. The developed welfare measure 
enables researchers to assign a measure of consumer surplus to speciﬁc alternatives in the context of a 
given choice set (which is the context dependency assumption associated with VL and RAM). In 
addition, the approach presented by McConnell, and implemented by Dekker and Chorus, is able to 
value changes in the non-price attributes of a speciﬁc alternative (the standard output being a WTP 
estimate) such as travel times. They illustrate how differences in consumer surplus between random 
regret and random utility models follow directly from the differences in their behavioural premise, 
which is aligned with, for example, a recent paper by Balbontin et al. (2019). 
 
In order to assess a change in an attribute level (say 1 and maybe 5 mins travel time) to obtain a 
probability change, we can use equation (11) of McConnell to obtain the change in consumer surplus 
in monetary units (see proof below). This enables us to obtain a welfare measure (see below) from the 
behaviour responses (through choice probabilities) regardless of the functional form of the utility 
expressions, assuming no income effect. Note that the Dekker and Chorus contribution is essentially 
that of McConnell, except they apply it in an RRM setting.  
 
In this proof, we focus on a change in an attribute associated with an alternative although the same 
method can be applied to a change in the choice set (e.g., removing an alternative). 
 
Define: 
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The welfare effect is 
= 0 *1 1CV [ln(1 ) ln(1 )] / βπ π= − − −  
 
where β is the parameter associated with the cost attribute (marginal utility of income). This assumes 
that choice is independent of income, although one still needs the marginal utility of income (MUI) to 
convert the welfare measure into money units, and if demand is constrained by budget then the MUI 
will exhibit certain properties which point back to integrabillity.  
What we have here is a simple comparison of the choice probability before and after a change in the 
level of an attribute. McConnell shows that this is equivalent to the Marshallian change in consumer 
surplus as the area under a demand curve. Moreover, as soon as the analyst starts integrating the demand 
curve then, irrespective of how demand is specified, one is pointing back to utility.   
In summary, the issue of getting useful information from non-RUMs is huge and needs further research. 
It also comes up in the contingent valuation (CV) debate: if CV estimates are inconsistent with utility 
maximisation (i.e., adding-up does not hold), can the estimates be used as a measure of welfare 
loss/gain? There is more to investigate, but there is a growing sense that context dependent 
representation of choice is so appealing that this is a research theme ripe for substantial effort. The 
question often put to the author is – what difference does it make in practice in respect of policy outputs 
such as willingness to pay estimates? We do not know, but we need to find out. 
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